In a significant development, China has declined several proposals presented by Pakistan regarding direct investments in various sectors under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). These sectors encompass energy, tourism, water management, and climate change, marking potential roadblocks in the corridor’s expansion.
The minutes of the Joint Cooperation Committee (JCC) meeting for CPEC held in October 2022 and subsequently signed by the Chinese Vice-Premier and Pakistan’s former planning minister, Ahsan Iqbal, on July 31 of this year, have brought to light the formidable challenges facing both nations in strengthening their economic ties.
The delay in signing the minutes underscores the existing disparities. It has been revealed that the draft shared with Beijing by Pakistan and the final minutes signed by both parties differed in various aspects.
China expressed disagreement with several measures proposed by Pakistan. The final document reflects Pakistan’s willingness to accommodate several Chinese demands in order to address Beijing’s concerns.
According to details reported by a local publication, China declined cooperation in cross-border tourism in regions such as Gilgit-Baltistan, Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan-controlled Jammu and Kashmir, and the nation’s coastal areas. Additionally, China did not consent to Pakistan’s request to include water resources management, climate change, and urban infrastructure development within the CPEC framework. A proposal to establish a new joint working group on water resources management and climate change also met rejection.
Furthermore, a plan to establish a transmission line from Hub to Gwadar in Balochistan province, connecting the seaport city with the national grid under the CPEC framework, did not receive approval. Similar outcomes were observed for a proposal to incorporate two hydel power projects in the CPEC energy cooperation agenda, with Chinese investors leading the implementation.
Other Pakistani propositions that failed to garner Beijing’s support included the development of a policy framework for coal gasification for fertilizer projects based on coal in the Thar desert of southern Sindh province. China also did not concur with meeting Pakistan’s energy requirements through indigenous resources or coal conversion for domestic consumption and exports.
Additionally, Pakistan’s proposal for Chinese involvement in a strategic underground gas storage project was omitted from the final minutes. The minutes remain silent regarding the endeavor to secure Chinese technology for joint exploration, development, and marketing of metallic minerals.
This latest development underscores the complexities and divergent interests surrounding the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, highlighting the challenges both nations face as they seek to advance their economic partnership.
